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A LAWYER LOOKS AT CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE:
HOW LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. REFRAMED THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION

ANDERS WALKER

ABSTRACT
This essay reconstructs Lewis F. Powell, Jr.’s thoughts on the civil rights
movement by focusing on a series of little-known speeches that he delivered in
the 1960s lamenting the practice of civil disobedience endorsed by Martin Luther
King, Jr. Convinced that the law had done all it could for blacks, Powell took
issue with King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail, impugning its invocation of civil
disobedience and rejecting its calls for compensatory justice to make up for
slavery and Jim Crow. Dismissive of reparations, Powell developed a separate
basis for supporting diversity that hinged on distinguishing American pluralism
from Soviet totalitarianism. Powell’s reasons for defending diversity are worth
recovering today, not least because courts continue to misinterpret his landmark
opinion in Regents v. Bakke, confusing the use of diversity in higher education
with the compensatory goals of affirmative action, a project that Powell rejected.



Professor, Saint Louis University Law School, Yale University PhD 2003, Duke University JD
1998, Wesleyan University BA 1994. I would like to thank archivist John Jacob at the Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. Archives at Washington & Lee University School of Law for invaluable assistance on
this project. I would also like to thank Erik Luna, Victoria A. Shannon, Samuel Calhoun,
Christopher M. Bruner, Brant J. Hellwig, Suzette Malveux, Margaret Howard, Margaret Hu,
Timothy C. McDonnell and the faculty at Washington & Lee University School of Law for their
comments, suggestions, and critiques; as well as Melissa Hart, Ellen Katz, Adam Winkler,
Christopher W. Schmidt, Tom Romero, Mary Ziegler, Ann Southworth, Dennis Parker, and the
participants at the 2014 Rothgerber Conference at the University of Colorado School of Law for
their comments on the piece.
1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2513085

INTRODUCTION
On a brisk spring day in April 1966, Richmond attorney Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. mounted a measured, thoughtful assault on the civil rights movement.1
Standing before an attentive audience at his alma mater, the Washington & Lee
University School of Law, Powell unloaded a steady forty-five minute barrage
against the movement’s most visible leader, Martin Luther King, Jr., for
embracing “reckless” tactics, invoking “irrelevant” arguments, and spreading the
“heresy” of civil disobedience.2 According to Powell, civil disobedience was
“fundamentally inconsistent with the rule of law,” a tactic that anyone “trained in
logic” should have “rallied promptly to denounce,” not least because it threatened
“the foundations of our system of government” and jeopardized the very “human
freedoms [that government] strives to protect.”34
Powell even mocked King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail, a Pauline
epistle that the black leader had penned in an Alabama cell in 1963, part of a
string of protest actions that had helped earn the minister international acclaim,
including a Nobel Peace Prize in 1964 for declaring that individuals had a “moral
responsibility to disobey unjust laws,” and that unjust laws were those that did not
square with the “law of God.”5 Powell found such a claim absurd. “Whatever
may be said for the idealism of a view that permits each man to apply his own
predilection as to a higher natural or moral law,” he argued, “it affords no basis
for a system of organized society.”6 To him, King’s argument was “simply a
doctrine of anarchy,” and no one who was “intellectually honest” could
reasonably claim its use was warranted in the United States, a clear jab at the
integrity of the black leader.7
1

Powell delivered his speech on April 16, 1966, a day that registered a high of 60 degrees
Fahrenheit in nearby Richmond, see “Weather History for Richmond, VA,” Week of April 10,
1966 through April 16, 1966, retrieved at:
http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KRIC/1966/4/16/WeeklyHistory.html?req_city=N
A&req_state=NA&req_statename=NA
2
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 205, 208,
224 n. 66 (1966).
3
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 205
(1966).
4
Whites who resorted to violence and “intimidation” were not representative of the South, argued
Powell, but rather a “small and depraved minority.” Lewis F. Powell, Jr., A Lawyer Looks at Civil
Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (1966).
5
Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” April 16, 1963, reprinted in MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT (1964, New York: Signet, 2000). Glenn Eskew refers
to the letter as a “Pauline epistle” in GLENN ESKEW, BUT FOR BIRMINGHAM: THE LOCAL AND
NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE 244 (1997).
6
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience,” 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 210
(1966).
7
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience,” 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 208
(1966). For him, the letter “met the needs of intellectuals and theologians for a moral and
philosophical justification of conduct which, by all previous standards, was often lawless and
2
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Powell’s effort to impugn King’s honesty at Washington & Lee was no
isolated rant. He mounted similar attacks on the black leader again and again
through the 1960s, in speeches, bar journal essays and law review articles, even
using his position as President of the American Bar Association from 1964 to
1965 to criticize the civil rights movement.8 Yet, Powell’s critiques faded from
view once he joined the Supreme Court in 1971, most experts turning to his
judicial opinions, which have since been remembered as moderate compromises
between liberal and conservative wings of the Court.9 Meanwhile, historians who
have delved earlier into Powell’s career have tended also to ignore his antimovement diatribes, finding evidence instead of a latent sympathy for civil rights,
most notably in his public rejection of massive resistance to Brown v. Board of
Education in Virginia in the 1950s.10
However, Powell’s critiques of King and the movement in the 1960s are
worth revisiting, not least because they provide insight into his ideas about black
rights, racial justice, and the appropriate relationship between law and social
equality, all ideas that went on to shape some of his most important opinions in
the 1970s and 80s. Though remembered as a moderate, Powell displayed little
sympathy for the black struggle in the 1960s, concluding instead that Brown’s
mandate had been met with the dismantling of overt segregation, and that the
quest for racial reform had, by the close of the 1960s, reached its logical
conclusion. This view reflected a larger sense on Powell’s part that the
Constitution was not a vehicle for reform so much as a framework for pluralism, a
guarantor of procedural fairness, and a bulwark against socialism; a doctrine that
Powell felt was emerging increasingly, and alarmingly, in the words and writings
of Dr. King. While Martin Luther King’s early call for the eradication of overt
Jim Crow laws in the South in the 1950s struck Powell as an acceptable, if not
completely copacetic, constitutional position; King’s shift from overt segregation
to more aggressive demands that the federal government end poverty, abolish
racial inequality and provide “compensatory” justice to blacks in the 1960s were

indefensible.” Only “reckless extremists” would endorse such a position. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., A
Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 206 (1966).
8
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Respect for Law and Due Process – the Foundation of a Free Society, 18
FLORIDA L. REV. 1 (1965); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 208 (1966); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Civil Disobedience: Prelude to Revolution? 40
N.Y. ST. B.J. 172 (1968).
9
J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. – A Personal View 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3
(2008); Oliver W. Hill, Tribute to Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11 (1992);
Vincent Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory? 67 CAL. L. REV. 23
(1979).
10
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 145 (1994). Powell tried to distance
himself from his early critiques of King, arguing in a note to John Jeffries that he was primarily
upset with King’s opposition to the Vietnam War, a position that did not fully account for the fact
that Powell criticized King long before the civil rights leader came out publicly against Vietnam.
See, e.g. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Lewis Powell IIII and John Jeffries, June 30, 1981, on file with
the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lexington,
Virginia (noting that “I’ve kept these papers in the event – after my death – there is criticism of
what I said about King after he became a Vietnam activist, contributing to disorders”).
3

not, as Powell saw it, legitimate constitutional matters.11 Social inequality,
believed the Virginia native, constituted a basic reality of life in the United States,
even contributing to what he termed America’s “pluralistic society,” a society
marked by racial, ethnic, religious, and economic “diversity” – a diversity of
experience and achievement that the Constitution was bound not to change but to
protect.12
Powell’s faith in diversity and doubts about equality provide particularly
relevant insight into one of the single most important questions confronting
litigation in the school arena today, namely the continued constitutionality of race
in university admissions.13 To Powell, who sanctioned the consideration of color
by admissions committees, diversity warranted constitutional protection on its
own terms, independent of affirmative action or other “compensatory” schemes,
precisely because it was a defining characteristic of American civilization that
distinguished the United States from the Soviet Union.14 Though his negative
views of the movement reeked of Confederate mothballs, Powell’s vision of
diversity and pluralism as bedrock values that distinguished the United States
from Russia provides an intriguing, perhaps even useful frame for assessing the
continued relevance of diversity in university admissions today. 15 Courts have
tended to miss this, presuming instead that diversity constitutes little more than a
guise for affirmative action programs aimed at addressing racial discrimination,
an argument popularized by Robert Dahl in the 1980s.16 However, Powell’s
11

MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT
124 (1964).
12
For work on the rhetoric of equality, see DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES (1981); PETER
WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF ‘EQUALITY’ IN
MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990). “A distinctive feature of America’s tradition has been
respect for diversity,” wrote Powell in 1982 in an opinion defending sex segregation in schools,
“[t]his has been characteristic of the peoples from numerous lands who have built our country. It
is the essence of our democratic system.” (Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
745 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring). Powell further elaborated on the importance of diversity in
Bob Jones v. United States, where he noted that “[e]ven more troubling to me is the element of
conformity that appears to inform the Court’s analysis.” Extolling the “important role played by
tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and
viewpoints.” Bob Jones v. United States, 461 U.S. 609 (1983) Quoting Justice Brennan, Powell
noted that “private, nonprofit groups receive tax exemptions because ‘each group contributes to
the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.”
Bob Jones v. United States, 461 U.S. 609 (1983) Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), 689,
90 S.C.t, 1421 (Brennan, J. concurring).
13
Tony Mauro, Ex-Wiley Rein Lawyers form Appellate Boutique, NAT’L LAW JOURNAL, retrieved
on 10/20/2014 at
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/supremecourtbrief/id=1202672649620/ExWiley-ReinLawyers-Form-Appellate-Boutique?cmp.
14
Martin Luther King, Jr. referred to the need for “compensatory” justice in MARTIN LUTHER
KING JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 124 (1964).
15
Powell’s take on the Cold War differed starkly from the liberal notion that integration was part
of what Mary L. Dudziak terms a “Cold War imperative.” See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation
as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
16
ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROl (1982);
Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 78 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court has tended to view diversity programs as
“penance for the specific sins of racism a government, union, or employer has committed in the
4

vision was different. He discounted the need for affirmative action, arguing that
African Americans had not suffered any more discrimination than whites and did
not deserve special dispensation by the state. However, he conceded that blacks
might nevertheless bring a unique perspective to the classroom, as might certain
privileged whites, both of whom could have low scores forgiven to achieve
diversity.
To further explain Powell’s views on diversity, race, and equality, this
essay will proceed in two parts. Part I will focus on Powell’s critique of the civil
rights movement in the 1960s, emphasizing those aspects of his argument that
explicitly addressed civil disobedience. Part II will then discuss the manner in
which Powell furthered his vision as a Supreme Court Justice, elevating his own
version of diversity to the Constitutional plane.17

I.

POWELL CRITIQUES THE MOVEMENT

For almost a decade following Brown v. Board of Education, Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. remained “steadfastly silent” about the civil rights movement.18 He
assured locals in Richmond, Virginia, for example, that he would not openly defy
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown, nor would he close public schools.19 Of
course, he also promised that he would do all that he could – within legal bounds
– to preserve segregation in the city, a task he assumed as head of Richmond’s
School Board.20 For example, he sanctioned elaborate “placement” schemes that
past”); Paul D. Carrington, Diversity! 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1105 (1992) (noting the adoption of
diversity rhetoric “to compensate members of groups said to be disadvantaged by historic
injustices to their ancestors”); Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1839, 1848
(1996) (observing that diversity “has become the preferred euphemism for the déclassé phrase
‘affirmative action”); Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573 (2000) (discussing
the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of Powell’s definition of diversity in lieu of one rooted in affirmative
action in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)); Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative
Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939 (1997) (arguing that
assessments of diversity should incorporate an awareness of past discrimination); Mark H.
Grunewald, Quotas, Politics, and Judicial Statesmanship: The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
Powell’s Bakke, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 53 (1992) (describing Powell’s Bakke opinion as an act
of judicial statesmanship); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in
Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (1990) (endorsing a case for affirmative action rooted in
challenging white supremacy and racial hierarchy). But see, Derrick Bell, Diversity’s
Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (2003) (criticizing Powell’s diversity rationale for
thwarting the cause of racial justice).
17
EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE SOUTHERN TRADITION: THE ACHIEVEMENT AND LIMITATIONS OF
AN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM (1994). See also Samuel W. Calhoun, Justice Lewis F. Powell’s
Baffling Vote in Roe v. Wade, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (2014)(arguing that Powell departed from
strict construction in the abortion context).
18
JEFFRIES, POWELL, 234.
19
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. “Statement on Behalf of the School Board Supporting Construction of the
New High Schools Without Delay,” May 6, 1959, 8, Folder: Richmond School Board, 1950-1961,
Box 94, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University Law School, Lexington,
Virginia.
20
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. “Statement on Behalf of the School Board Supporting Construction of the
New High Schools Without Delay,” May 6, 1959, 8, Folder: Richmond School Board, 1950-1961,
5

assigned students to schools based on factors that were only obliquely related to
race, meanwhile constructing new facilities to alleviate overcrowding. 21 “[I]t is
the considered opinion of the Board,” explained Powell in May 1959, “that the
new schools would appreciably improve both the short and long range prospect
for minimizing the impact of integration.”22 Though Powell conceded that at least
some integration would be necessary to survive Supreme Court review, he tended
to frame the admission of small numbers of black students to predominantly white
schools as tactical efforts aimed at preserving rather than transforming the status
quo. We foresee no substantial integration in the elementary schools in
Richmond,” assured Powell in 1959, noting that ample facilities existed for a
continuation of dual systems, meanwhile advocating the construction of new
facilities to accommodate black students at the high school level.23
Even as some wondered whether Powell might secretly sympathize with
the black plight, his actions indicated otherwise. By the time he stepped down
from his position as chair of Richmond’s school board in 1960, for example, he
had helped steer Richmond away from massive resistance, rewritten local policy
to comply with the Supreme Court, and preserved segregation virtually intact:
only 2 of 23,000 black children in Richmond attending school with whites.24
While even such miniscule integration angered hardcore segregationists, Powell
cautioned massive resisters to accept token integration lest the federal government
come knocking.25 More frustrated were black leaders like Richmond attorney
Henry L. Marsh III, who claimed that Powell had “simply been [more] ingenious
and sophisticated” than his more radical white counterparts in preserving Jim
Crow.26
Even more frustrated were young blacks, including college students in
Richmond who gave up on legal process late in the winter of 1960, entering
whites-only eating establishments and demanding to be served.27 Powell
remained silent on such protests, even as they escalated to integrated bus rides
Box 94, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University Law School, Lexington,
Virginia.
21
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. “Statement on Behalf of the School Board Supporting Construction of the
New High Schools Without Delay,” May 6, 1959, 8, Folder: Richmond School Board, 1950-1961,
Box 94, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University Law School, Lexington,
Virginia.
22
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. “Statement on Behalf of the School Board Supporting Construction of the
New High Schools Without Delay,” May 6, 1959, 8, Folder: Richmond School Board, 1950-1961,
Box 94, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University Law School, Lexington,
Virginia.
23
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. “Statement on Behalf of the School Board Supporting Construction of the
New High Schools Without Delay,” May 6, 1959, 8, Folder: Richmond School Board, 1950-1961,
Box 94, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University Law School, Lexington,
Virginia.
24
JEFFRIES, POWELL, 234.
25
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. “Statement on Behalf of the School Board Supporting Construction of the
New High Schools Without Delay,” May 6, 1959, 8, Folder: Richmond School Board, 1950-1961,
Box 94, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University Law School, Lexington,
Virginia.
26
JEFFRIES, POWELL, 234.
27
James Jackson Kilpatrick, The Sitdowns, THE RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Feb. 22, 1960.
6

through Richmond in 1961, to demonstrations in Albany, Georgia in 1962 and,
finally, in 1963, to a massive campaign of civil disobedience in Birmingham,
Alabama.28 During that campaign, local authorities arrested black minister Martin
Luther King, Jr. and locked him in the city jail, prompting him to write an
extended letter justifying the use of civil disobedience to effect legal reform.29
King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail garnered almost immediate national
attention when it was published in the Atlantic Monthly in August 1963 and again
in a larger book by King entitled Why We Can’t Wait in 1964.30 The letter
provided a sustained defense of civil disobedience, arguing that “one has a moral
responsibility to disobey unjust laws,” and that unjust laws were those that were
“out of harmony” with “the law of God.”31 The issue had arisen when a local
judge issued a temporary injunction forbidding “marches,” “picketing,” and “sitins” in Birmingham, effectively thwarting the civil rights movement’s campaign
there.32 Long respectful of legal process, King and others decided to defy the
court, thereby embarking on a “revolutionary shift” in movement tactics, away
from efforts to uphold the “judicial system” and towards concerted – albeit
peaceful – law-breaking.33
Disappointed with this move, a group of local
ministers wrote a letter criticizing King’s tactics, arguing that his radical approach
was actually thwarting interracial solutions in the region, a critique that King
dismissed out of hand.34 To the black leader, moderates who counseled adherence
to legal process were increasingly becoming a roadblock to justice; prompting
him to unleash a scathing indictment not just of the Birmingham ministers but
white moderates generally in the South. “I must confess,” lamented King, “that
over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate.
I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro’s great stumbling
block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen’s Counciler or the Ku
Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to ‘order’ than to
justice … who constantly says: ‘I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I
cannot agree with your methods of direct action.”35
It was a blistering indictment, but arguably one that King had to make. If,
for example, he had adhered to legal process in 1963, Birmingham would never
28

See e.g. CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S
(1981); RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
114 (2006); DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE
SOUTHERN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986).
29
JONATHAN RIEDER, GOSPEL OF FREEDOM: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.’S LETTER FROM
BIRMINGHAM JAIL AND THE STRUGGLE THAT CHANGED A NATION (2014).
30
Martin Luther King, Jr., The Negro is Your Brother, 212 THE ATLANTIC 78-84 (Aug. 1963);
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. WHY WE CAN’T WAIT (1964).
31
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT
(1964).
32
ESKEW, BIRMINGHAM, 237.
33
ESKEW, BIRMINGHAM, 240 (noting that “a deliberate violation of the law signaled a
revolutionary shift for King, who had always subscribed to the NAACP’s view of respecting the
judicial system”).
34
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY (1958)
35
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT
(1964).
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have drawn the national attention, or support for federal legislation, that it
ultimately did.36 Neither would the movement’s next major campaign, in the
forgettable hamlet of Selma, Alabama; where King would also choose to violate
an injunction, this time a federal one.37 King’s recurring disobedience contributed
directly to federal action, both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, helping to explain his contempt for moderate pleas that the
movement adhere to legal process.38
However, if King hoped that his attack on legal process would lead
southerners like Powell to side with the movement, he was wrong. Powell
appeared particularly stung by King’s jabs – including the one against moderates
like himself – and began to reference Letter from Birmingham Jail in a series of
increasingly hostile speeches against King and the movement. His first was at a
Law Day address in Columbia, South Carolina on May 1, 1964. Noting recent
“disobedience of court orders,” “sit-ins,” “demonstrations,” and “other racial
disorders by adults,” Powell announced to an audience of attorneys that, “it is not
surprising that crime and delinquency by children within schools appear to be
increasing sharply.”39 “Unless our cherished system of liberty under law is to
become a mockery,” he continued, “the courts – rather than the streets – must be
the arbiters of our differences.”40
Powell’s aversion to the streets revealed an awareness of the manner in
which civil disobedience flaunted legal process. However, his allusion to this
topic on May 1 was important for another, arguably deeper reason; for the goal of
“Law Day,” as Powell explained it, “was to dramatize the contrast with
Communism’s May Day.”41 For Powell, the occasion commemorated the stark
contrast between America’s “freedom under law” and the “repressive system of
Communism” a system that, to his mind, placed redistributive ends above
procedural means.42

36

GLENN ESKEW, BUT FOR BIRMINGHAM: THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE CIVIL
RIGHTS STRUGGLE (1997); CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (2014); TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: TWO
PRESIDENTS, TWO PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2014).
37
JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. AND
THE SOUTH’S FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 238 (1993).
38
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT
(1964).
39
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “Law Day: A Time for Rededication,” address before South Carolina Bar
Association, Columbia, South Carolina, May 1, 1964, File: Law Day, Box 28, LPPP, 5.
40
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “Law Day: A Time for Rededication,” address before South Carolina Bar
Association, Columbia, South Carolina, May 1, 1964, File: Law Day, Box 28, Washington & Lee
University School of Law, Lexington, Virginia, 5.
41
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “Law Day: A Time for Rededication,” address before South Carolina Bar
Association, Columbia, South Carolina, May 1, 1964, File: Law Day, Box 28, Washington & Lee
University School of Law, Lexington, Virginia, 8.
42
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “Law Day: A Time for Rededication,” address before South Carolina Bar
Association, Columbia, South Carolina, May 1, 1964, File: Law Day, Box 28, Washington & Lee
University School of Law, Lexington, Virginia, 5.
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Powell’s interest in Communism stemmed at least as far back as 1958,
when he visited the Soviet Union with a delegation from the ABA. 43 During this
trip, he became impressed by the strides that the Soviets had made in education,
even as he recoiled at the restrictions imposed by the Soviet state on its people.44
“The entire educational system” in the U.S.S.R., noted Powell, “is planned and
operated with the purpose of thoroughly indoctrinating every child with Marxism;
the theme that the Marxist always triumphs is an ever present one, and the
inevitability and ‘justness’ of the ‘class struggle’ is taught both directly and
indirectly.”45
Powell found Soviet schools to be direct evidence that
“Communism requires a totalitarian dictatorship,” where the “instrument of power
is the small minority” who impose “its will upon the masses.”46
Powell drew a direct link between Soviet totalitarianism and civil
disobedience at a meeting of the American Bar Association in Texas in the
summer of 1965, just as the Voting Rights Act was being put into effect.47 He
began by lamenting “the growing lack of respect for law and for due process” in
America, noting that one of the primary causes of civil unrest in the nation was
“the growing belief that laws and court orders are to be obeyed, constitutional
safeguards honored, and the rights of others respected only so long as they do not
interfere with the attainment of goals believed to be just.”48 To illustrate, he
quoted one of his predecessors, Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, who held that
“[t]hose who encourage minority groups to believe that the United States
Constitution and federal laws give them a right to patrol and picket the streets
whenever they choose in order to advance what they think to be a just and noble
end, do no service to those minority groups, their cause or their country.” 49 Black
wrote his opinion in 1965 in response to civil rights demonstrations in Baton
Rouge; also engaging questions that appeared to stem directly from King’s
endorsement of civil disobedience in 1963. However, Powell went farther than
Black in condemning King, arguing that his Letter from Birmingham Jail invited
totalitarian rule. “The fundamental difference between a totalitarian society, and
one in which the individual is afforded freedom of conscience and protected from
43

Lewis F. Powell, Jr. “Soviet Education: Means Towards World Domination,” (Report on Trip to
Soviet Union, July-August 1958) Folder: A Means Toward World Domination, Box 27: Speeches
& Writings, 1930-1962, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of
Law, Lexington, Virginia.
44
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. “Soviet Education: Means Towards World Domination,” (Report on Trip to
Soviet Union, July-August 1958) Folder: A Means Toward World Domination, Box 27: Speeches
& Writings, 1930-1962, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of
Law, Lexington, Virginia.
45
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. “Soviet Education: Means Towards World Domination,” (Report on Trip to
Soviet Union, July-August 1958) Folder: A Means Toward World Domination, Box 27: Speeches
& Writings, 1930-1962, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of
Law, Lexington, Virginia.
46
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “Notes on Panel Program,” National School Boards Association Meeting,
April 26, 1960, Chicago, Illinois, F: Richmond School Board, 1950-1961, Box 94, Lewis F.
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arbitrary force,” explained Powell, “is that in the latter ‘means’ are of the essence.
Under our system, the ‘end,’ however worthy, should never justify resort to
unlawful means.”50
It was an almost complete inversion of King’s position, which was that a
narrow-minded focus on lawful means almost certainly foreclosed the pursuit of
meaningful ends: in this case the eradication of racial inequality in the United
States. However, Powell claimed an even higher end than King, declaring the fate
of American freedom itself to be in the balance; whether racial inequities were
addressed or not. This was not simply an argument for gradualism, as scholars
have tended to maintain, but the postulation of a very different set of values than
the ones King set forth, values that might be said to have placed the preservation
of an ordered liberty over the achievement of substantive, or distributive equality.
“Our freedoms can only survive,” concluded Powell, “in an ordered society,
where there is genuine respect in action as well as words, for law and orderly
processes.”51 Powell’s faith in processes reflected a larger sense that procedural
justice alone was important, a concept that respected the dignity of individuals by
including them in the political process, whether or not that process resulted in
egalitarian results.52
Powell continued his critique of King in a subsequent talk delivered at
Washington & Lee University Law School in April 1966. During that talk, he
raised the same issues that he had in Texas, but focused more directly on King’s
Letter from Birmingham Jail, even citing it to show how King should be criticized
for spreading the “heresy” of civil disobedience.53 “Articulated by Martin Luther
King in his much publicized Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” argued Powell, civil
disobedience “quickly gained nationwide attention and support outside of the
South,” in part by invoking the concept of a “higher law” that was superior to
written law.54 Precisely such a law, however, had been invoked by southern
segregationists to justify their resistance to Brown, Powell maintained. “If the
decision to break the law really turns on individual conscience,” noted Powell, “it
is hard to see in law how Dr. King is any better off than former Governor Ross
Barnett of Mississippi, who also believed deeply in his cause and was willing to
go to jail.”55 To illustrate, he cited the case of “James Farmer and other CORE
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workers” who “were arrested for lie-downs at the World’s Fair in New York.”56
While Farmer and company claimed that they “were simply using disobedience
techniques” to dramatize “the contrast between the [Fair’s] glittering world of
fantasy and the real world of brutality, bigotry and poverty,”57 Powell displayed
little sympathy. “If valid breach of peace and trespass laws may be violated at
will to protest these age old infirmities of mankind,” he maintained, “rather than
seeking to ameliorate them by lawful and democratic processes, there would soon
be little left of law and order.”58 “Even the ebullient Dr. King,” mocked Powell,
“has recognized that his theory is not ‘legal.’”59
Powell unleashed his final salvo on King in 1968, just before the black
leader was gunned down on a motel balcony in Memphis.60 He began by
lamenting the explosion of riots in American cities, including Watts in 1965,
Cleveland in 1966, and Detroit in 1967. For Powell, ’67 was “a year of crises in
which the symptoms of incipient revolution are all too evident.”61 The
“revolution” as Powell explained it, was being stoked by “militant leaders” like
Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, a Louisiana native and graduate of
Southern University who also happened to endorse armed resistance to white
oppression.62 Brown became notorious for condoning inner city riots with
slogans like “burn this town down” and “stop singing and start swinging.”63
Powell had little patience for such rhetoric, arguing that what had begun as a
controlled, middle class campaign to dismantle formal segregation had devolved
into a much less organized call for violent revolt. To Powell, Rap Brown and
Carmichael were part of a logical, if frightening progression, heirs to the early,
seemingly innocuous theories espoused by Martin Luther King, Jr.64
As Powell saw it, King was not a moral leader so much as a “prophet of
civil disobedience” guilty of planting seeds of unrest by advancing specious
theories, among them the notion that some laws were “just” others “unjust,” and
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that “each person” could “determine for himself which laws” [were] ‘unjust’” at
which point they were “morally bound – to violate the ‘unjust’ laws.”65 To
establish this point, Powell cited King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail, as a call for
extra-legal means of reform that amounted to “heresy.”66 “It is paradoxical,” he
noted, “that this threat of rebellion should come at a time of unprecedented
progress towards equal rights and opportunities for Negroes. Moreover, as the
New York Times has stated editorially: American Negroes ‘are economically the
most prosperous large group of nonwhites in the world, enjoying a higher average
income than the inhabitants of any nation in Africa, Asia, or Latin America.’”67
Remarkably tone deaf to persistent inequality in the United States, Powell
dismissed black complaints as illegitimate quibbles over the inevitable
inequalities of life, or what he termed the “age old infirmities of mankind.”68
Powell’s sense that blacks expected too much stayed with him, even as he
won appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1971. There, he
would come to decide a series of cases that touched on racial issues, often arriving
at original results. Many came to view him as a moderate intent on reconciling
the more radical wings of the Court, others deemed him simply an unpredictable
swing vote. However, Powell’s rulings on race appear more consistent if viewed
through the lens of his earlier critiques of the civil rights movement, all efforts to
impose a very different conception of the appropriate relationship between law,
race, and equality on America, as the next section shall demonstrate.
II.

POWELL ASCENDS TO THE COURT

Not four months after Martin Luther King died in Memphis, a panel of
experts published a report suggesting that “Negro violence” had become so
intense it was “likely to influence the Presidential election” of 1968, boosting
“candidates advocating more stringent law enforcement.”69 Though the report’s
contributors found that most African Americans did not in fact “want to
overthrow American society,” they nevertheless concluded that the “revolutionary
rhetoric of [black] extremists,” had stoked “white intransigence” emboldening
conservatives to campaign heavily on platforms emphasizing law and order.70
Few sold law and order more deftly than Richard Milhous Nixon, former
Vice President under Dwight D. Eisenhower and long-time White House hopeful.
Three months before King’s death, in January, Nixon warned a banquet hall full
65
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of Manhattan businessmen that a “war in the streets” was likely that summer,
sparked by “race conflicts.”71 Serious law enforcement, continued Nixon, was the
best strategy for preventing such conflagrations, not poor people’s campaigns, not
direct action protest, and certainly not left-wing calls for restructuring American
society. Even a federal report on riots issued by the conservative Kerner
Commission struck Nixon as soft, in part because it blamed “everybody for the
riots except the perpetrators of the riots.”72
However, Nixon did not the blame riots on Martin Luther King. To
Nixon, King remained “a great leader” despite his forays into increasingly radical
tactics, and increasingly revolutionary politics, just prior to his death.73 More
contemptible, blasted Nixon, was the Supreme Court, who had sided with
“criminal forces” over “peace forces” by imposing unreasonable requirements on
police, suggesting to the former Vice President that certain Justices had “‘gone
too far’ and injected ‘social and economic ideas’ into their opinions.’”74 To
counter such a move, Nixon promised voters he would appoint Justices likely to
“interpret the Constitution strictly and fairly.”75 To follow through, he tapped two
Circuit Judges – Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun – an Assistant Attorney
General from Arizona named William H. Rehnquist and, finally, after two flubbed
southern selections, Lewis F. Powell, Jr.. Ostensibly committed to strict
construction, Powell fit two other criteria as well.76 One, he occupied a
prominent, widely-respected place in the American legal profession, having
served as President of the American Bar Association and in several high profile
federal posts. Two, he hailed from the South, providing Nixon with a means of
replacing Alabama Justice Hugo Black and also reaching out to southern voters
who had begun to migrate from the Democratic Party to the Republican in states
like Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee.77 Such voters had made their
presence known in the 1968 presidential election and promised to do so again in
1972, boosted by Alabama Governor George Wallace, a conservative stalking
horse who junked his motto “segregation forever” for bombastic appeals to “law
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and order” that even northern voters found appealing, or at least sufficiently so to
put him on the ballot in every northern and western state in ‘68.78
As Wallace lit the North like a burning cross, Nixon drew more genteel
southerners, like Powell, to his camp.79 Though Powell joined Wallace in
condemning civil disobedience, he also served on the National Advisory
Committee on Legal Services to the Poor, endorsing legal representation to the
indigent, a concern that struck many as evidence of a sympathetic, perhaps even
liberal streak.80 However, Powell’s interest in representing the poor coincided
less with liberal leanings than with his deep-seated commitment to legal process,
the same commitment that had led him to blast King for lawlessness.81 Few
recognized the degree to which Powell’s interest in legal services dovetailed with
his antipathy for King, an outlook that sought procedural fairness and respect for
the disadvantaged, but a firm rejection of radical political means, and even more
radical, redistributive ends. Like Atticus Finch, Powell believed that the poor
deserved representation but showed little interest in redistributing wealth, opting
for procedural over substantive reform.
Nixon could not have found a scion of southern order more eloquent, more
reasonable, and ultimately more prepared to curb the contours of the civil rights
struggle than Powell.82 Though deeply implicated in Richmond’s circumvention
of Brown, he fox-trotted through his hearings; transforming the gauntlet of the
Senate Judiciary Committee into a Richmond cotillion. Critical to Powell’s
success was his astute awareness that the civil rights movement had pushed far
beyond what most Americans felt was a reasonable horizon of racial reform.
Integrating buses and drinking fountains, understood Powell, was something most
Americans could accept. Ordering people’s children to suffer interminable bus
rides every morning to achieve “racial balance,” however, was not; nor was
rewriting American law to achieve King’s dream of substantive, poverty-ending,
job-providing, “compensatory” equality.83
Powell gained a chance to elevate his views on equality early in his tenure,
when the Court agreed to consider a Texas challenge to public school funding in
June 1972. The plaintiffs represented Mexican-American children who lived in
“school districts with low property valuations,” prompting them to argue that
funding schools through local property taxes led to gross inequalities in education,
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violating the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.84 In Texas alone, for
example, students who happened to live in wealthy school districts received an
average of $585.00 per pupil, while students in poor districts averaged only
$60.00 per pupil.85 The consequent difference in educational quality, argued the
plaintiffs, was substantial.
Powell seized the case as an opportunity to engage the question of
persistent inequality in the United States, meanwhile elevating an even higher,
more compelling state goal than eliminating distinctions between rich and poor.
He began by conceding that while funding and education may be linked, poor
people might occasionally find themselves in wealthy districts. “The taxable
wealth of the school district,” explained Powell to his clerks in a private memo,
“does not necessarily reflect the wealth of the citizens who reside in it.”86 To
illustrate, Powell cited Sussex County, Virginia, where a corporation named
Vepco had “recently constructed an atomic power plant” that substantially
boosted revenue from local property taxes.87
Of course, most poor children were unlikely to have nuclear plants
bankrolling their schools. The plaintiffs made clear, for example, that the tax
revenue per student in their downtrodden Edgewood district amounted to $21 per
student, while the tax revenue per student in the city’s more affluent Alamo
Heights district amounted to $307 per pupil, a dramatic contrast.88 However,
Powell’s point was not to say that all poor students could expect atomic funding,
but rather to demonstrate that poverty alone was not the target of state
discrimination. Some poor, he noted, did land in well-funded districts, thereby
weakening the case that wealth classifications operated in the same categorical
way that racial classifications did.89
Still, Powell could not deny that “reliance on local property taxation for
school revenues” yielded unequal results, providing “less freedom of choice with
respect to expenditures for some districts than for others.”90 However, even this
was not necessarily a negative. In Powell’s mind, one of the advantages of
preserving inequality in school funding was that it kept schools tied to local
communities, thereby inhibiting centralized state “control.”91 Altering school
funding, he warned, threatened “national control of education,” a move that he
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likened to communism.92 “I would abhor such control for all the obvious
reasons,” complained Powell, “I have in mind the irresistible impulse of
politicians to manipulate public education for their own power and ideology – e.g.
Hitler, Mussolini, and all Communist dictators.”93 This, of course, was what he
had witnessed in the Soviet Union in 1958.94
Here was a thread. Just as Powell had linked civil disobedience to Sovietstyle totalitarianism in his attacks on Martin Luther King, Jr., so too did he link
the centralization of school funding to totalitarianism in his attacks on proponents
of leveling school resources. In both instances, he equated efforts to achieve
distributive equality with Soviet-style communism, even as he extolled America
for resisting that communism, whether by stressing procedural justice or keeping
school funding a local, decentralized matter. Of course, King and others had long
argued that a preoccupation with procedural equality and decentralized rule, or
“states’ rights,” limited the chances of obtaining substantive, federally-enforced
justice, but this was precisely why Powell disliked King: their views of what
constituted justice, and what constituted equality, differed.
For example, Powell actually found inequality to have some benefit.
“Each locality,” argued Powell in San Antonio v. Rodriguez “is free to tailor local
programs to local needs,” an arrangement that lent itself to a multiplicity of
educational approaches, or what he called “pluralism.”95 “Pluralism,” declared
Powell, “affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence.”96 Even if some school districts received
less money, in other words, they could always develop new ways of teaching,
perhaps even arriving at more effective forms of pedagogy than wealthier
districts. It was a slightly obtuse, arguably tone deaf argument when juxtaposed
onto the gross inequalities that gripped San Antonio schools, but it illuminated a
vibrant strand of Powell’s political thought. The perpetuation of inequality, to
him, was not necessarily a bad thing, for it held out the possibility of encouraging
innovation and growth.
Powell’s interest in the symbiotic relationship between innovation and
inequality suggested a very different vision of law’s role in society than that
espoused by Martin Luther King. King stressed the evils of inequality,
particularly the harm it caused to racial minorities and the poor.97 As he put it in
1964, “rural and urban poverty” had “stultified” the lives of the poor, demanding
aggressive state action, including “a massive program by the government of
special, compensatory measures” for blacks who had been “robbed” of their
wages during slavery.98
Powell found such arguments for reparations
unpersuasive, chastising blacks for not recognizing that they were in fact
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considerably better off than their peers in Uganda and Zaire.99 Not only did he
dismiss black gripes as unwarranted, but he found King’s insistence on “massive”
government action to smack of communism, a system he personally loathed.100
Powell’s tendency to associate King with communism placed him firmly
within a larger current of political thought in the South at the time, a sense that the
civil rights movement was infiltrated by reds.101 While evidence of this
ultimately proved flimsy, Powell’s critique of the movement was quite a bit more
sophisticated than most. To Powell’s mind, the movement did not have to be
infiltrated by actual communists to still pose a threat to cherished American
ideals, among them the ideals of diversity, competition, and the pursuit of
pecuniary wealth.102 Such ideas drew strength from earlier traditions in southern
thought, including a brand of political and constitutional thinking that historian
Eugene D. Genovese termed “the southern tradition.”103 While much of that
tradition was tied to presumptions about race, it held to be true a series of
fundamental principles about government that stood alone, independent of racial
concerns.104 Among these were notions set forth by Virginia planter James
Madison who, two hundred years before Powell penned Rodriguez, declared that
individuals of “different and unequal faculties,” invariably acquired “different
degrees and kinds of property” and that the “protection” of those faculties, and
that property, was “the first object of government.”105 Essential to this view was
the notion that inequality could be positive, and that government should protect
inequality precisely because it incentivized people to develop their talents, or
“faculties.”106 People, Madison presumed, were different, and that difference
should be rewarded. Anything else, including efforts to achieve “an equal
division of property,” constituted a “wicked project.”107
Strains of Madison’s thinking reverberated in Powell’s reasoning about
the appropriate relationship between law, race and inequality in the context of
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schools. Though Powell conceded that overt racial classifications could no longer
be used to structure southern society, he remained adamant that the elimination of
Jim Crow did not at the same time necessitate “compensatory” redistributions of
wealth. Racism may have been forbidden by law, but inequality was not. In fact,
as he noted in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, inequality remained, just as it had for
Madison, a good thing. It encouraged innovation, incentivized teachers in poor
schools to utilize their faculties, and encouraged pluralism.
Powell’s faith in pluralism emerged in other decisions as well, most
notably a challenge to affirmative action plans in university admissions in 1978.
There, he wrote the controlling opinion in a case involving a white plaintiff
named Allan Bakke who had been denied admission to the University of
California at Davis Medical School.108 Convinced of his eligibility, Bakke
blamed his rejection on a policy that reserved sixteen out of one hundred available
entry positions to minorities, including African Americans, Mexican Americans,
and American Indians. While average scores for minority accepts hovered around
the 35th percentile on the Medical College Admissions Test, or MCAT, Bakke’s
score neared the 90th percentile, fueling his outrage that lower scoring minorities
had been admitted before him.109
Conservatives on the Court, like William Rehnquist, sided immediately
with Bakke, arguing that the racial set-asides endorsed by UC Davis were
discriminatory. In a joint opinion, Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and
Rehnquist agreed that UC Davis’s quota system violated Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, which banned racial discrimination by any institution that
received federal funds.110 Though the Act had been written to ameliorate
conditions in the American South, conservatives on the Court believed that the
Act applied to any institution that singled out individuals by race. Whether the
victims of such policies were minorities or not, they argued, quotas like the one at
the UC Davis Medical School represented an arbitrary and therefore illegitimate
racial classification.111
Liberals Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Marshall all disagreed, siding
with the school officials.112 To them, the UC Davis program was race conscious
but not discriminatory. Unlike segregation statutes in the American South, which
they viewed to be fundamentally racist, Davis’s affirmative action plan did not
stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority, nor did it direct an “allegation of
inferiority” against whites.113 Therefore, because Bakke was never “stereotyped
as an incompetent,” his claim fell flat.114
Powell disagreed. To his mind, racial considerations were invalid so long
as they sought to compensate minorities for past discrimination, a position that
had animated his early critiques of Martin Luther King and the civil rights
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movement.115 “[T]he purpose of helping certain groups,” held Powell, simply
because they were “victims of ‘societal discrimination’” did “not justify a
classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent [Allan
Bakke] who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the
special admissions program are thought to have suffered.”116
However, Powell did identify a separate rationale for allowing
consideration of race in admissions to survive: a rationale that he associated with
pluralism, or what he termed “diversity.”117 Citing First Amendment protections
of academic freedom, Powell claimed “genuine diversity” to be an interest
sufficiently compelling to allow schools to rely on racial considerations in
deciding to admit students with lower test scores.118 So long as such programs
did not rely on quotas, posited Powell, “racial or ethnic origin” could be taken
into account, as could “geographic” origin and whether applicants were
“culturally advantaged or disadvantaged.”119
To many, this was confusing. “For reasons that were not – and could not
be – satisfactorily explained,” complained Powell biographer John Jeffries,
“Powell insisted that fixed quotas ‘would hinder rather than further attainment of
genuine diversity.’”120 Yet, Jeffries missed the manner in which Powell felt that
diversity operated independent of questions of “compensatory” justice, applicable
both to whites who were “culturally advantaged” and blacks who were not.121
Unlike legal liberals, Powell did not think of diversity as part of a larger scheme
for overcoming past discrimination against African Americans, but rather an
attempt to recognize the inherent, rich diversity of the United States, a diversity
that coexisted with substantial, at times even remarkable, levels of inequality.122
Even Powell supporters missed this. To them, Powell’s decision
represented a strategic compromise or, as Circuit Judge Henry Friendly put it, a
laudable example of “moderation.”123 General Maxwell Taylor hailed Powell’s
invocation of white minorities as an “amazing feat of making all parties
reasonably happy.”124 Harvard Law Professor Alan M. Dershowitz proclaimed
Powell’s opinion “an act of judicial statesmanship.”125 Others saw in Powell’s
ruling more than simply an aim to compromise but a genuine shift in his
segregationist views in favor of the African American struggle. According to
Jeffries, for example, Powell’s decision reflected a clear break from his past,
evidence that he suddenly felt “personal responsibility for racial justice.”126
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Yet, Powell forthrightly rejected the idea that blacks had suffered
injustice, at least not any more than other “minorities” in the United States.127
Indeed, Powell seemed to indicate that whites had themselves become something
of a discrete and insular minority, even victims of past repression. “The white
majority,” argued Powell in Bakke, is itself “composed of various minority
groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the
hands of the State and private individuals.”128 “[T]he United States had become a
Nation of minorities,” he continued, including Mexicans, Chinese, and “Celtic
Irishmen.”129 Each had to struggle, “and to some extent struggles still.”130
Though aware that the Fourteenth Amendment had been written expressly for
“members of the Negro race,” Powell insisted that its language was sufficiently
neutral to embrace a broader principal including discrimination against other
“minorities” as well, including whites.131
While many liberals celebrated Powell’s decision as a victory for blacks,
more critical voices balked.132 One prominent detractor was Thurgood Marshall,
who complained that it is “more than a little ironic” that Powell would rule in
favor of Bakke given the “several hundred years of class-based discrimination”
directed against African Americans in the United States.133 Others took an even
harsher line, finding Powell’s invocation of diversity little more than a bid to
enhance the educational experiences of whites by allowing for the “token
assimilation of people of color.”134 According to this view, Powell’s model of
diversity meant little more than “assimilating token people of color into the
dominant white-supremacist culture for the benefit of maintaining that culture.”135
Yet, Powell did not necessarily believe there was such a thing as a
“dominant white-supremacist culture.”136 To him, diversity was a more robust
concept, a call for including students of different backgrounds, even advantaged
backgrounds, both black and white. “The diversity that furthers a compelling
state interest,” he noted, “encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important
element.”137 Indeed, in Powell’s mind, any admissions program that “focused
127
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solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine
diversity.”138
Admittedly, this was not about correcting past injustice. However, a close
reading of Powell’s critique of the civil rights movement in the 1960s reveals his
conviction that there was no past injustice to correct, or at least not any publicly
sponsored injustice that warranted legal remediation. Inequality, such as it was,
argued Powell, posed no legal issue, a view that departed dramatically from
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s position that “massive” public responses were needed to
address structural racism and poverty.139 Powell rejected King out of hand, in
part by placing inequality firmly within a larger frame of pluralism, or what he
termed diversity.
As Powell explained it, diversity bore a close relationship to the First
Amendment’s protection of academic freedom, a protection that allowed public
schools to pick and choose who to admit and what to teach them.140 If schools
chose to admit minority students with lower test scores, for example, they could
do so, provided their goal was linked to pedagogical and not redistributive or
“compensatory” goals. For precisely this reason, Powell envisioned public
schools admitting other types of students with lower scores as well, including
candidates who were – surprisingly – “culturally advantaged.”141 Presumably this
included applicants who hailed from privileged backgrounds, like legacy students
at Harvard, whose plan Powell took as an inspiration.142
In a memo written in August 1977, Powell’s clerk Bob Comfort alerted
the Justice to the diversity argument, noting that UC Davis had cited Harvard’s
plan to justify including minority candidates with lower scores than Alan Bakke.
“Petitioner repeatedly sounds the theme of academic freedom to pick a diverse,
invigorating group of students,” noted Comfort, “[j]ust as a farmboy from Idaho –
simply by being different – brings something to Harvard College that a Boston
Brahmin cannot.”143 Harvard’s interest in Idaho farmboys proved more
complicated than Comfort let on, stemming from fears in the 1920s that Jewish
applicants with high grades were trouncing their gentile counterparts on the
college’s admissions test.144 Administrators and alums alike feared that Harvard’s
traditional student stock: elite, North East Protestants might find themselves a
minority at the school, their cultural influence on campus weakened by large
numbers of immigrant, East European Jews reluctant to assimilate.145 To
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compensate, Harvard’s admissions committee developed a plan to de-emphasize
test scores and admit students from diverse regions based solely on their high
school GPA, effectively diluting the number of Jewish applicants with Wasps
from the South and Mid-West.146 Harvard continued to expand this white-centric
“concept of diversity” following World War II, looking not simply at geographic
diversity but also different backgrounds and a wider variety of “talents and
aspirations.”147
The Crimson plan suited Powell nicely, underscoring his argument that
diversity had nothing to do with affirmative action for blacks, and that whites
were not a unified bloc.148 However, Powell did not endorse a blanket
requirement that all schools seek diversity in the same manner that Harvard did.
For example, Powell found that some schools provided diversity simply because
they adhered to a particular educational vision, a position that led him to endorse
private religious schools. “Parochial schools,” argued Powell in 1977, “have
provided an educational alternative for millions of young Americans,” often
encouraging “wholesome competition with our public schools,” a point similar to
the one that he had made in San Antonio v. Rodriguez.149 Though Powell took a
conservative view of the extent to which states could financially support sectarian
schools, he nevertheless recognized the role that such schools played in
“promoting pluralism and diversity” among the nation’s “public and nonpublic
schools.”150
Nonpublic, or private, schools played a particularly important role in
Powell’s America, not least because they provided, as he put it in 1967, the
“major remaining barrier to maximum integration – socially, racially, and
economically.”151 This was startling. Though he had formally accepted the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown, Powell still dared articulate a critique of
integration that tied into his larger fear of centralization and authoritarianism. In a
manner that is worth noting, given its relatively late date, Powell viewed racial
integration and economic integration to be parts not of the same solution, but the
same problem, a move towards what he termed the “mass production” of
“thoughts and ideas.”152
That private schools might thwart integration did not bother Powell, nor
did the idea that some schools might disseminate unpopular ideas. For example,
Powell took issue with the notion that institutions who found themselves
pedagogically “at odds with [the] declared position of the whole government”
146
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could not claim tax exemptions in 1983.153 “Given the importance of our tradition
of pluralism,” explained Powell, the IRS should keep in mind that exemptions for
unpopular institutions provided an “indispensable means of limiting the influence
of governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life.”154 The case at
hand, Bob Jones University v. the United States, involved a controversial
university policy that banned interracial dating. Though Powell agreed that such
a policy could not stand under Brown, he made sure to note that simply because
an institution espoused an unpopular view did not necessarily mean that the IRS
could withhold tax exempt status.155
Averse to orthodoxy but proud of pluralism, Powell even celebrated
schools that boasted grossly exclusionary policies under the rubric that they
provided diversity. For example, he wrote a dissent in a challenge to the
Mississippi University for Women’s exclusion of men, arguing that excluding
men allowed the institution to promote the goal of diversity. “Left without honor
– indeed, held unconstitutional,” argued Powell, “is an element of diversity that
has characterized much of American education and enriched much of American
life.”156 This element, continued Powell, was same-sex education, an institution
sewn into America’s pluralist quilt. “A distinctive feature of America’s
tradition,” explained Powell in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, “has
been respect for diversity. This has been characteristic of the people from
numerous lands who have built our country. It is the essence of our democratic
system.”157 Same-sex education, continued Powell, comprised “a small aspect of
this diversity.”158 The male plaintiff struck Powell as an unsympathetic character
“who represents no class and whose primary concern is personal convenience.”159
“Coeducation,” argued Powell, “is a novel educational theory,” given that for
“much of our history” most children were educated in “sexually segregated
classrooms.”160 To bolster his point, Powell cited New England’s “Seven Sister”
colleges: Mount Holyoke, Vassar, Smith, Wellesley, Radcliff, Bryn Mawr, and
Barnard, explaining that such schools produced a “disproportionate number of
women leaders” in part because the large number of female faculty provided “a
motivation for women students.”161 Though the gender demographics of allfemale colleges was less diverse than at coeducational institutions, the simple
existence of an all-female option provided, argued Powell, “an element of
diversity.”162
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Presumably, Powell could have made the same argument about
historically black colleges, a topic that never came before him as a judge.
However, Powell’s invocation of diversity in Bakke suggested that explicit
considerations of race, like explicit considerations of gender, were perfectly fine
so long as they comported with a particular, pedagogical vision.163 However,
Powell barred the use of race for purposes of compensatory justice; a move that
he refused – bizarrely – to make for women, noting that women’s colleges served
not only the goal of pluralism but also aimed “to overcome the historic repression
of the past,” a point that he was not willing to concede in the context of racebased affirmative action.164 Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun and Marshall all
disagreed with Powell on this point, arguing in Bakke that programs which sought
to benefit blacks should be assessed under a lower standard scrutiny, like the one
that applied to women.165 Powell rejected such a notion, countering that all racial
minorities, including white minorities, had suffered discrimination in the past; an
arguably tenuous point that nevertheless resonated with Powell’s critique of the
civil rights movement, a critique that held law had done all it could for African
Americans, and that no further, legitimate correctives for past injustice were
required.166
Powell’s lack of sympathy for blacks coincided with his lack of sympathy
for the poor, a position he charted in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, where he also
found pluralism midst the dramatically unequal funding patterns of public
schools, even schools that received only a fraction of the money that their better
located, peer institutions did. Of course, this had nothing to do with pedagogical
goals: schools that found themselves in poor districts obviously did not choose to
receive less money.
However, Powell found arbitrary funding less
constitutionally relevant than preserving the overall landscape of educational
diversity, a landscape that incorporated relatively broad ranges of inequality, both
in terms of funding, student body composition, and curricula. To Powell, such
incongruities were actually a good thing, relating directly to America’s core
identity as a “pluralistic society” that stood apart from the totalitarian “orthodoxy”
endorsed by the Soviet Union. Shocked at Soviet educational policies during his
trip to the U.S.S.R. in 1958, Powell returned with a profound sense that
totalitarian regimes relied heavily on uniformity in education to indoctrinate their
youth, a phenomenon that he worked hard to avoid. Countering such a trend was,
to his mind, the essence of American pluralism, an institution that struck Powell
as not only central to the academic freedom protected by the First Amendment,
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but to liberty itself. As he saw it, diversity in education possessed inherent value,
independent of compensatory justice or affirmative action.

CONCLUSION
Little attention has been paid to Lewis F. Powell’s critiques of civil
disobedience in the 1960s.167 As this essay demonstrates, however, Powell took
the movement to task repeatedly in public speeches, bar journal pieces, and law
review articles, challenging the use of direct action protest to achieve legal
reform.168 Of particular interest to Powell was Martin Luther King Jr.’s Letter
from Birmingham Jail, a widely celebrated document that justified peaceful lawbreaking in the name of achieving a broad definition of racial equality in the
United States, one that included “compensatory consideration” to African
Americans for slavery and Jim Crow.169
Powell rejected such a vision, linking it to models of redistributive justice
that characterized totalitarian regimes like the Soviet Union, which Powell visited
in 1958.170 To counter, Powell advanced a very different theory of justice, one
that hinged on procedural fairness but allowed for substantial, substantive
inequality.171 In fact, Powell even went so far as to find value in the perpetuation
of inequality, one of the many sources of America’s great diversity, or
“pluralism.”172
Powell’s interest in pluralism is worth recovering today, not least because
proponents of diversity tend to conflate their cause with the achievement of racial
equality, a move that Powell refused to make. Long suspicious of the civil rights
movement, Powell drew a stark line between the compelling interest of diversity
and the significantly less compelling interest of racial equality, something that he
considered to be a completely separate, more dubious goal. However, Powell’s
distinction has been all but lost. Current proponents of diversity in higher
education, for example, continue to conflate their cause with affirmative action, a
type of compensatory consideration that emerged out of the civil rights battles of
the 1960s.173 Similarly, opponents of affirmative action have also tended to
confuse diversity with efforts to compensate blacks for past repression, a cause
they argue is illegitimate and unworthy of constitutional protection.174 Recently,
the Supreme Court itself weighed in on the issue, also confusing diversity with
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affirmative action in a challenge to a state law banning the use of racial
classifications in college admissions.175
Powell provides a refreshing, if not completely un-troubling, corrective to
the current confusion. By advancing a case for diversity as a compelling state
interest that had nothing to do with racial equality or compensatory justice, he
provides us with a way of thinking about the use of race in college admissions
programs that should, on its face, have nothing to do with affirmative action.
While Powell’s refusal to acknowledge problems with persistent racial inequality
may be troubling, his doctrinal separation of diversity from affirmative action
gives us a reason for endorsing creative considerations of race and other factors in
college admissions that should not, on their face, have anything to do with
timelines, invocations of Brown v. Board of Education, or other contentious
matters dealing with questions of substantive equality and racial justice.176
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